Sit’n goes are immensely popular online, so that is what a lot of this column and book will examine. They are also played at tournaments and in some cardrooms. The difference in the “normal” format of three being compared to winner-take-all formats is mentioned in one chapter, but is not central to this book. The satellite possibilities (also mentioned) are not talked about at length here, but as they are only mentioned as a counterpoint to the SNGs I don’t have any problem with this at all.

The things I like most about this book are: that the correct way to play in sit-and-goes is explained; that this is contrasted with other forms of no-limit hold’em; that mention of winner-take-all events is made; that computer modeling is used; that computer tracking is recommended; and that specific examples are given for almost every situation.

Now, what I don’t like, or openly disagree with, is almost the same list. (Let’s take specific examples off this list, because I think they are wonderful, as well as a big positive — it adds an interactive element!) What do I mean when I make this outrageous statement? Let’s be specific: My biggest disagreement comes with using computer modeling. The computer is a marvelous tool and a great aid to playing correctly. As Gurdjieff once said about the mind, “It’s a wonderful servant… and a miserable master!” That said, a computer simulation is only a mathematical centerline for correct play. In teaching one always has this problem, in how to present all the variables that helps one make the correct decision at the table, so that at that moment, you are playing your ‘A’ game. This is exactly why you have to put in hours at the poker table as well as read and study. Some players have an instinctual understanding, an ability to make the right move at the right time. Some seem to be “lucky” over some period of time. Here we are attempting to move beyond statistical fluctuations and cut to the chase.

Personalities, position, and stack sizes are given in most examples in this book and that is essential knowledge for a professional. Beyond that knowledge you have to have your rear in the chair and be paying some attention to what is going on — Player B may usually be TAG (Tight-AGgressive) but now he is mad at the world and drinking… suddenly he is going all in at every opportunity!

Every answer leads to more questions and this is no exception. Would you rather be multi-tabling online and playing 12 tables at once with an expected hourly wage of five dollars an hour from each, or playing six tables with an expected hourly wage of nine dollars each? Part of this is personality, for sure. Is the stress of playing more games worth the possible small increase in theoretical and expected hourly profit worth it? You’ll decide for yourself if you choose this path of play, but for sure when you play more tables your ability to follow the changes in others will be hampered.

This past week I was playing an online tournament where a player chose to move all-in from mid-position on hand number one for 3000 in chips with blinds of 10/20! That was bad enough but his actual hand was T-5o! It was passed to the big blind, who had a hand he couldn’t lay down — A-A! Perhaps the T-5 had somewhere to go, perhaps the wife was pulling him away — but in any case, no matter what excuse we make for him, why did he enter this tournament? I doubt that his purpose was just to prove how horrid his decisions were, or that money didn’t matter to him, but who knows.

I find notes very useful, but I never place too much value on them. What I mean specifically is that even if someone plays one hand abominably that does not mean that they are an abominable player. It is one play in one session—it could have been a misclick, it could have been a blood-sugar imbalance, it could have been a maiden voyage on the computer — we don’t know everything we would wish to, that is for sure.

Back to the recommendations in the book Sit’n Go Strategy. The tie-in here is that we can track results and we can track players, but don’t let that be the most important factor in deciding how to play against those same players. It can be useful but it can also be misleading. When you’re in the game with someone you’ll be able to see what type of player they likely are within one round. Of course, if their personality is shifting, as yours should, as the sit-and-go progresses you’ll have a weaker read at first, but after a few sit-and-goes the mystery will be gone.

In regards to how to play sit-and-goes I disagree with a few examples and one phase of the book. But if I were teaching someone else how to play, and they weren’t very experienced, I would say to use this book as a guideline, and use the computer to back it up. If you are a sit-and-go player, or are interested in playing them, this is a great book for starting your quest. The examples, as given, are great food for thought.

Until next time, play good… and get lucky!

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A hand developed that provided an interesting moment of discovery for some at the table.

I was dealt a queen up and a couple of blanks in the hole. I had played very few hands all night. My image among the regulars was that of a tight player. The two newbies were also aware of my tight nature since I had played so few hands. They also
tended to fold on the stud hands since they were pretty much saving their ammunition for the hold’em games they were familiar with.

There were five opponents. Two players folded to me. I raised it to $5 with just my queen. All of the players folded around to the bring-in – one of the new guys who hadn’t learned how to play stud. He reluctantly called. I would have been happy if he had folded.

On fourth street he got a suited card – a queen, as it turned out. I got a king. I kept up my bluff and bet. He hemmed and hawed for a long time, showing his hand to others – who remained respectfully silent, waiting for him to act before commenting on what he should do. Reluctantly he folded. He then exposed his hand and we commented on it. I folded my hand into the muck so no one would know that this rock actually bluffed. (I decided to maintain the fiction that I never bluff.)

He had four hearts. He remembered that two other hearts had folded and commented that he figured he was far behind because of how few hearts were left. And he gave me credit for a pair of queens.

Another good player at the table said that he definitely should have called and maybe should have even raised – even giving me complete credit for queens.

The table concluded that the player should have called (and they didn’t even guess I was bluffing.)

I did the math by checking with my favorite on-line hand calculator, twodimes.net. They will instantly analyze heads-up matchups (and offer multi-way as well). Based on the number of suited cards that were out and the cards they thought we each held (again, giving me credit for a pair of queens I didn’t have), the guy with the four-flush should indeed have called. He was a 52% to 48% favorite.

I shared this story with a friend of mine. He concluded that the guy made a good choice in folding, since if he didn’t hit a flush on fifth street he’d be an underdog. Though he was barely a favorite on fourth street, my friend concluded, he’d be forcing himself to call bets where he’d be the underdog – thus making it prudent, if not mathematically correct, to fold.

My friend is wrong. My opponent should certainly have called, if not raised. He should have raised if he detected even the slightest chance that I was bluffing. He also should have raised because he had the advantage, however slight, in a limit game – building a pot that he’d expect to win more than half the time. Similarly, by raising he was expanding the size of the pot he’d be drawing for if he missed on fifth and sixth street – giving himself a better price to continue to draw on later streets.

Many players make the mistake my friend made – in assuming that a drawing hand should fold into a made hand. This is a mistake that costs otherwise good players money in the long run.

Let’s take a look at the math behind the good decision to call with the four-flush. We’ve already looked at fourth street. The four-flush is ahead, which is perhaps counter-intuitive since his hand isn’t yet made. But he’s ahead, nevertheless. So, what about my friend’s point regarding fifth street?

Let’s assume that I caught a blank and my opponent caught a non-suited card. He will win the hand, roughly 40% of the time. He has fallen into being a 3:2 underdog.

There is $25 in the pot from the prior rounds, antes and bring-ins. I have bet $10. So He’s being asked to spend $10 to win $35. Here’s how he should do the calculation.

If he stays to the river and wins, which he’ll do 40% of the time, he’ll win a pot of what would be $85. It will cost him $30 more, including his $10 call on fifth street, to do so, for a profit of $55. So 40% of $55 = $24 profit.

On the other hand, if he doesn’t improve to a winning hand, which will happen 60% of the time, he’ll spend $20 more (since he won’t bother to call or bet on the river if he doesn’t catch his flush). This means that he is profiting $4, overall, by calling on fifth street with a four-flush.

Let’s take it to sixth street. If he still hasn’t caught his flush, should he call on sixth street with a four-flush into what he assumes is a pair of queens?

By sixth street the pot is $55. A call costs $10. He is getting 5.5:1 for his call. And the odds against him making a flush are about 4.7:1. That’s an overlay – a good bet. He should still call.

With all that, my opinion is that sometimes the best play is a raise on fourth street. First of all, there’s the chance that the person who is betting with the exposed queen is bluffing. Your raise will give him a chance to fold, awarding you a pot on what amounts to a semi-bluff raise. It will also cause your opponent to be less inclined to bet strongly against you when you appear to have a drawing hand. The raise you make in this hand may translate into checks he makes in future games, saving you even more money in the long run.

The other reason for raising is that you may buy yourself a free card on fifth street. Your opponent may well check. You can then check behind him for a free card on sixth. So for the $5 raise on fourth you’re saving a $10 bet on fifth.

You might also be able to buy the pot on fifth. If you raise on fourth and he does call you, he may well check into you on fifth and then fold if he hasn’t improved, convinced that you are ahead. Of course he may well call your bet on fifth. But a passive call on fourth may also have resulted in his bet on fifth. At least with your raise you give yourself the possibility of two ways of saving money on fifth if you hit.

And if you hit on fifth street with another suited card, your raise has given you excellent deceptive value, since it’s unlikely he’ll put you on a flush. If he improves to two pair or trips he’s likely to bet into you. He will think that since you raised on fourth you probably had a pair and that the third suited upcard only looks scary. You’ll be able to extract an extra bet either then or on a later street when you raise him and he calls.

The bottom line is that a four-flush on fourth street is surely a hand worth playing, not folding, even when it’s heads-up.

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In hold’em, players’ hands develop simultaneously and identically as the board progresses from the flop to the turn and the river. All players share the same board. All watch it as it is turned. Accordingly, all but the least experienced and worst hold’em players are aware that a third card of one suit on the river, for example, may mean a flush for an opponent. Players with two pair are correspondingly careful about betting when that happens. Players on the turn drawing for a straight, when there are three suited cards on the board, are similarly cautious –- aware that they may be drawing dead.

But in stud, players are sometimes so absorbed in their own hands, and how they are developing, that they may not be paying attention to how their hand is stacking up against the hands that their opponents are likely to hold.

This is especially true of the beginning and intermediate player who has learned which starting hands to play and which to discard. He waits for one of few powerful starting hands, gets one, and then if the hand improves as hoped, he continues to play until the river, bound to ride the horse he jumped on at the beginning of the ride. What he’s failed to recognize is that absolute improvement is not nearly as important as relative improvement.

Here’s an example from a recent home game I was in. The lineup was pretty soft –- primarily recreational players who liked to call. One player was more serious, though not necessarily more skilled. He understood the importance of folding poor starting hands, but didn’t appreciate the importance of looking around and evaluating his hand relative to the rest of the hands that were out.

He started with a three-flush on third street. He called, as did four other players. On fourth street he hit a fourth suited card. Two of his opponents paired their door cards. The higher of the two pairs made a double bet. The other player raised. The player with the four-flush called.

This was a terrible call. True, he had a four-flush and, with his flush cards all live, had about a 50% chance of making his flush. But he was against at least one and maybe two sets of trips right off the bat on fourth street. They also have about a 50% chance of making a full house. He should have folded his flush draw.

Here’s another example. A player with a split pair of jacks raised the bring-in. Two players with overcards called. The first held a king, the second a queen. On fourth street the player with the split jacks caught a blank. The player with the king caught an ace. The next player caught a six:

(J 4) J 2
(x x) K A
(x x) Q 6

The second and third player checked and the first player, with his pair of jacks, bet. The next two players called.

On fifth street the player with the jacks caught another deuce; the second player caught a blank and the third player caught a jack. None were suited.

(J 4) J 2 2
(x x) K A 4
(x x) Q 6 J

The first player, now with two pair, bet. The second player raised. The third player re-raised. The first player called, as did the second player.

The first player made a terrible call. Unless each of his opponents is a maniac, logic and observation require a fold here.

True, the first player improved. Improving is good in a vacuum. But the betting action and exposed cards of his opponents demonstrates that he is very, very far behind. The second player must have either kings or aces up or trips. The third player almost surely has trip queens or trip sixes. In any case, jacks up, with one dead jack, is a huge underdog and very unlikely to improve to a winning hand. He should fold to the double bet rather than continue to draw for one of three cards that will give him a full house (and quite possibly a losing full house even if he makes it).

The problem for stud players is that they, like all poker players, begin their poker lessons by learning hand values. This is how poker is taught. We’re all taught that a full house is a strong hand and a pair is a weak hand. In hold’em, since all hands are derived from a common board, players immediately recognize that all hands are relative. A flush is a good hand –- but only if the board can’t make a full house. Trips are a good hand, but only if the board can’t make a straight or a flush.

But in stud, players are inundated with data –- up to eight exposed cards on third street and then more on each successive street, plus their own hands. It’s easy for them to put blinders on and just think about their own hand and its chances of improvement – neglecting their opponents’ hands and their opponents’ chances of improvement as well.

The good stud player pays attention to all of the data and weighs his hand’s chances of improvement relative to the likely improvement of his opponents’ hands. Sometimes, though his hand may improve –- but when weighed against the likely superior improvement of his opponent’s hand, the best move is still to fold.

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The chapters by David Grey and Keith Sexton on seven-card stud, regarding tournament play, are full of valuable information. I concur with most of what is said and imagine that they can only make the fields tougher if anyone reads them. For selfish reasons, I
hope they don’t. For practical advice, just read the Sexton chapter. If you want to think about tourney situations that arise, then read the Grey chapter. I remember David saying many memorable things to me on Day Four of the WSOP Main Event, and I will share one here: “I would love to play with more [tournament] champions but most of them can’t afford the ante of the regular game I play in.” David is not only verbally glib but freely gives out statements that are challenging for the thinking player.

The chapter on Omaha pot-limit, high-only, is full of good advice but is written by Chris Ferguson, whose background as a tournament player is well-documented. Still, perhaps someone who plays that game for money on a more frequent basis could have written about it… perhaps Phil Ivey or Gus Hansen or Erick Lindgren, to just throw a few names out there, limiting our selection to Full Tilt biggies.

While we are at it, why not have Steve Zolotov write about pure gambling? He is one of the best there is at all-around gaming ability. Not to impugn Rafe Furst here, but Steve has at least 30 years of experience in countless games on which to draw, and he is also an official ‘friend’ of Full Tilt. In the late seventies we all feared Steve at the Mayfair Club in New York whenever some obscure game came up. One popular game at the time was liar’s poker, played with the serial numbers of dollar bills, where you added the numbers of your bill to the other guy’s to decide to outbid or challenge any claim. Steve was the uncrowned king of this game. This was a famous bridge club, and was stocked with famous brains; it later produced many well-known players, including Eric Seidel and Howard Lederer.

I feel that the chapter written by Howard Lederer on limit hold’em is great and has very important information to consider within it. In the future, limit hold’em will make a comeback and no-limit hold’em will return to be the king of tournaments. That statement might shock some of the readers but it is based on experience. No-limit hold’em for cash is a trapping game and random players are turned off by the acting that goes with it. Eventually all the weak money is taken and players return to the more affordable games. Limit hold’em means that one can play for set periods of time. It is as simple as this: you get a lot more bang for your buck when you play this game! Limit hold’em is a game that is wonderful for beginners, too, as when you are wrong it will usually only cost you a relatively small part of your stack. This is always true, of course, if you understand risks and fluctuations and plan accordingly.

Chapter 13 is about Omaha eight-or-better by Mike ‘The Mouth’ Matusow and it’s very good. Do as he says and not as he does! He knows how to play, even while talking; the rest of us might not do as well in multi-tasking. I am reminded of playing no-limit hold’em in one of the WPT events at the Bellagio where a player kept talking to Dewey Tomko. He was obviously an old friend who hadn’t seen much of Dewey in recent years. Finally Dewey took one of his earplugs out and, scowling, leaned over to reply, “I’m trying to concentrate on my play, and I suggest you do the same!” Talk about a re-direct!

Ted Forrest presents stud eight-or-better in Chapter 17 and presents valuable information that can make even bad players okay. It would take years of experience or an excellent mentor to give you such clear advice on what and how to play in this game. I think talk of how to alter your play in different positions makes this chapter really important, even if stud eight-or-better is not your game of interest. Ted details both playing situations and the decisions that spring from those situations, very important for the player that lacks experience. This is the most important material in the entire book. I’m rather stunned that Ted went into the possibilities so deeply. He even defines ‘short-stacked’ for everyone. Furthermore, he gives some very important advice on how to play heads-up. This advice applies to all games, in my opinion, not just stud eight-or-better. Don’t just get there and then try to think on your feet; have a plan and stick to it. As H.O.R.S.E. tournaments become popular, razz and stud eight-or-better remain mysterious areas for some competitors.

Lastly, Ted and Huckleberry Seed discuss correct actions in razz in the final chapter and again give a lot of terrific advice. Sadly, they will make a lot of hopeless players into competitors if they read this book. Razz is a game that is often played very poorly for multiple reasons. Now those readers can understand imaginative and advanced plays, and get the reasons for those plays from the mouths and thoughts of great and acknowledged players. The talk about variance alone makes this chapter worthwhile.

The review of this book was much more complex than I originally thought. There are more than 400 pages here, with many thoughts on how to play and many games that are featured. Bottom line: If you are a tournament player this book is well worth buying.

Until next time… play good and get lucky!

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“Never give advice. Wise men don’t need it and fools won’t heed it!”

Just for fun, I went over my notes from playing sessions over the past few years. I make notes when I hear or read something that I think is especially useful or awful. This is from my awful file.

A columnist who
writes for low-stakes players just starting out in poker writes, “…never play a hand the same way twice in a row. It will make you too predictable.”

What a dreadful piece of advice for the new low-stakes player. You make money in those games, for the most part, by taking advantage of the loose, bad play of your opponents. They call too much; they overbet their hands, they can’t read your hand, they don’t know when they’re drawing dead; they don’t respect your raises; they frequently call when they should raise; they often don’t bet their hand when they should; and they don’t understand when to raise. And here this advice-giver is telling you to make sure to mix up your play to avoid having your opponents figure out how you play.

They can’t even figure out their own play. How are they going to figure you out?

The truth is that in these games, the best strategy is often to play with the discipline and regularity of a machine. It’s true that mixing up your play may be important against observant, skilled and disciplined opponents who are aware enough to notice what you do (and disciplined enough to respond properly to your action). However, against many bad opponents who call too much, varying your play is often a bad mistake. Why bother mixing up your play against people who don’t pay attention and don’t act correctly?

Don’t waste ‘moves’ on players who won’t remember and can’t figure out what you’re doing. They’re there to play. They’ll call you when you bet for value even when they’re behind. Don’t waste your money on confusing opponents who are already confused.

Here’s another tidbit of horrendous advice for new casino players in these low-stakes games. “Figuring out your opponents is the most important skill you can develop in poker.” He goes on to explain that you need to focus your attention on how each of your opponents plays so you can maximize your wins.

To be fair, it’s surely helpful to know how your opponents play. But asserting that it’s the most important thing incorrectly minimizes what really is important in most low and intermediate poker games.

New and low-stakes players shouldn’t focus on figuring out their opponents. Rather, it’s much more important to learn the relative value of your starting cards, to learn to bet and raise aggressively when you are in the lead. You need to learn to fold hands that don’t have much promise. And you need to learn how to call bets on the river when you have at least a thin chance of winning the pot. And while it’s true that learning how your opponents play is helpful, especially as you move up to tighter and more aggressive games, it falls distantly behind all of those other factors when it comes to profiting in low- and medium-stakes poker. So, sure, pay attention to your opponents. Try to remember who the loose and tight players are and some of the more obvious tells. But first, you must learn the basics of winning play like what hands to play and how to play them. Advocating otherwise is just terrible advice and will end up costing you money.

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You are dealt three cards of the same suit, the exposed one an ace. One or two of your suit are exposed elsewhere. One player, showing a high card, raises the bring-in and one or two other players call. You call too, looking for the flush. On fourth street, sure enough, you get your fourth suited card. You play your flush draw conventionally, checking and then calling the initial bettor. The other players fold. It’s heads up going into fifth street.

On fifth street you get the fifth suited card, giving you a
flush. Your opponent does not show a pair. He just has his premium card from third street. You are still high on board with your ace. No other aces have been played. You suspect your opponent has a premium pair – perhaps two pair.

Here’s the question. Do you bet your flush or check it?

Each action has its merits. You have an unusually strong hand on fifth street – an ace-high flush against a probable pair. You’re certainly in the lead and likely to stay there throughout the hand. You clearly would like your opponent to call you on fifth street and thereafter. A check might induce your opponent to continue to bet and to lull him into thinking, incorrectly, that you don’t yet have a flush. Your bet on fifth street might convince your opponent that you caught a flush. He would then probably fold, depriving you of money on sixth street and the river. So perhaps a check is best.

On the other hand, your check might be followed by his check, causing you to lose a bet. And it might look suspicious – especially to a good opponent who might expect you to bet an exposed three-flush on fifth street whether or not you made a flush. He might check behind your bet and then fold on sixth street when you bet, convinced that you caught your flush.

What to do?

Here’s my general rule of thumb. It’s a bit counter-intuitive.

If I am against a particularly tight player, I will most likely bet the hand. If I am against a moderately loose player, especially a good player who tends to play a lot of hands on third street, I will often check the hand. Again, this is a rule of thumb. Other factors may come into play – that I’ll touch on briefly – but this is what I generally do.

That seems counter-intuitive, no? You’d think that I’d check against the very tight player. He’s looking for an excuse to fold – so I’d be inclined to check to keep him in the hand, no?

In fact, however, very tight players are more inclined, in general, to stay in a hand once they reach fifth street. They play so few hands that they are loathe to back out of them once they have committed themselves to the pot. This is a flaw, to be sure – and one that is best exploited with aggression, not passivity on your part.

The moderately loose player, on the other hand, is in many hands on third street. He may well be the better player, looking to exploit his superior skill on later streets by playing more hands early on than the super-tight player. He may not have as much invested in winning any particular hand he plays – since he plays many more hands. Each hand makes up a much smaller percentage of his play. Thus, ironically, the moderately loose player, unlike the super-tight player, may be tighter later in the hand – when he is in the habit of reassessing where he stands and how he will play or not play a hand.

There are a few other factors that can influence my decision. If there have been a few extra players in the hand on third or fourth street I’m more inclined to bet my hand – since I don’t mind knocking them all out on fifth street. And I’m less likely to knock them all out of the hand because the larger size of the pot, caused by the larger number of people in the hand, will be more likely to entice them to call. And I don’t mind knocking them all out as much as if the hand were heads-up for two reasons: First, I’m winning more money than I would in a heads-up pot; Second, if there are more players against me on fifth, I’m less likely to win if they all chase me to the river. With four or more players in the hand on fifth street, for example, I’m surely betting my flush on fifth street. If it’s been heads-up since fourth street then I’m very likely to check if I’m in the lead, or just calling if my opponent is high on board and betting.

Similarly, if my opponent’s cards are all completely live and if he has an exposed pair I’m much more likely to bet – since I figure he may well try and draw his full house against my potential flush. He may contrast the possibility that I don’t have my flush with the 6-to-1 shot of making his full house by the river and conclude that it makes sense for him to draw for it (generally, it doesn’t make sense unless he is at least fairly certain that I’m bluffing).

Finally, if I have been winning unconceded pots lately – especially a couple or more in a row, I will be more likely to bet the hand – since I may be giving off the impression that I am ‘playing a rush’ and trying to bully my way to victory without ‘the goods’. The more my image is that of a wild, loose, and overly aggressive player the more likely I will be to bet and the less likely I’ll be to check the hand.

Image surely isn’t everything in poker. But when it comes to deciding how I come down on a close call like this, the combination of my image in my opponent’s mind and his image in my mind will often be the deciding factor.

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Every time you play a hand differently from the way you would have played it if you could see all your opponents’ cards, they gain; and every time you play your hand the same way you would have played it if you could see all their cards, they lose. Conversely, every time opponents play their hands differently from the way they would have if they could see all your cards, you gain; and every time they play their hands the same way they would have played if they could see all your cards, you lose. – David Sklansky, “The Theory of Poker”

Simple, straightforward, valuable, clear…

And wrong.

I know that it may be considered heretical in the religion of poker to challenge this statement. But though there is much in it that is valuable and correct, though many times this may be so, it is surely not correct every or time or nearly every time. And so, as a whole it is wrong. By the time you finish reading this series of articles, I’m sure that if you are open-minded, you will agree with me.

If both you and your opponent always knew the mathematically correct betting action when you and he viewed all of the cards in play, then if you got your opponent to deviate from his correct strategy because you mislead him about your cards, you would gain and he would lose – and vice versa.

Everyone can agree that nearly all of the time, this would be the case when there were no more cards to come. If, for example, it was the river with no more cards to come, and you convinced your opponent by your raise that he should fold, when if he could see your cards he would have seen that he beat you, then you gain and he loses. True. Obvious. Similarly, if there were no more cards to come, and you had two pair, and your opponent’s betting convinced you that he had a flush and you folded, when in fact if you could see his hand you would see that he has a busted flush and you would have correctly called, you would lose and he would gain.

But before the final round, when there are still cards to come, many players would make the wrong play even if they could see their opponents’ cards. And so, paradoxically, if they deviated from that play that they would have made had they been able to see their opponents’ cards, they might be backing into the right play.

It’s weird, I know.

But here’s the simple problem with many players’ stud play. They do not know the correct play – or they do not make the correct play even if they know it – when there are more cards to come. And they make this wrong play not because they are fooled about their opponents’ hands but because they just do not know the correct play in that situation.

Even knowing what their opponent has they fold when they should raise, they call when they should fold, they fold when they should call, etc.

Sklansky’s Fundamental Theorem of Poker does not account for that serious problem, and in so doing it misleads players into focusing on mixing up their play and making deceptive plays when they should instead focus on learning the correct betting action based on what their opponent is likely to hold.

For me it’s like giving a spoke wrench to a new owner of a bicycle. He will use this great tool. But because he hasn’t been properly tutored he may well use it incorrectly, knocking the wheels of his bicycle out of true – and ending up needing the help of a bike mechanic.

The saying goes, “A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.” For me, teaching beginning and even intermediate players that they should focus on deception – before they have mastered the fundamentals – often pushes that player’s game out of true… with disastrous consequences.

In future columns I’ll give you some examples of how players often misplay their hands – even knowing or guessing correctly what their opponents have. And then I’ll explain what the correct play is, and why. This, for me, is the critical step that Sklansky and others incorrectly presume poker players already have taken before applying the Fundamental Theorem of Poker.

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I drove down, arrived an hour before the tournament was set to go off and found there were no open seats in either the $20/40 or $10/20 game. So I eagerly took one of the four open seats in the $5/10 game, becoming the fifth player in the game.

My first concern was resisting the urge to try and run over the lower-stakes short-handed game. This is a powerful temptation in such a game for me for two reasons. First of all, since I normally play higher, the stakes lure me into “screwing around” by playing more
wildly than normal. It takes some discipline to take the lower stakes seriously. It’s a normal distraction, but also a potentially damaging one. A few foolish hands that go to the river in $5/10 can cost over $100.

The other temptation comes from it being short-handed. This temptation is based on the apparent and oft-held, but incorrect, notion that it makes sense to bluff more frequently in a short-handed stud game. With fewer players, and thus fewer opponents, it seems that bluffing more often than in a full game is a correct strategy. But it isn’t. Let me explain.

It’s true that there are fewer players who must be convinced of the true strength of your hand when you bet – since there are fewer players to begin with. But the object in poker is not to win the pot but to maximize the money you win.

In stud, a short-handed game has a pot that is smaller to start off with than a full game. Think about it. Each player antes $1 in a $10/20 game. In a full game that is $8 in antes. The bring-in is $3. That’s a pot of $11 in a full game. In a five-player game an ante steal wins the five antes plus the $3 bring for $8, a $10 bet to win $8.00. In a full game the steal attempt risks $10 to win $11. That’s a much better return on the investment.

A stealer in a short game may win more pots. But the risk-to-reward ratio is worse for him – and so it makes less sense.

But, you might ask, aren’t there fewer players to convince? Wouldn’t that make it more likely to succeed?

Not necessarily. In a full game, timed correctly, a bluff may only need to convince one player. Just wait until it’s only you and the bring-in.

What you really should be doing in a short-handed game is value-betting more. Those hands that are medium strength for a full game are more likely to be the best hand at the table in a short-handed one – since there are fewer opponents. So you’ll be in more hands and being more aggressive – but it won’t be because you’re trying to bluff more but because your hand is more likely to be the best one at the shorter table.

Similarly, drawing hands tend to be less profitable – since there are likely to be smaller pots than in full games. This isn’t always true, of course, since even full games can be heads-up most of the time if you’re up against tight players. But in short games, it’s less likely on average that you’ll have many players going to the river – meaning the money you win when your draws come in is likely to be less. This, in turn, makes it generally less profitable to play those drawing hands.

In any event, I held in check my natural inclination to be more aggressive in this short-handed game. As it turned out, I got out drawn on the river a few times and managed to lose $25 in about an hour while I waited for the tournament. Who’s to say if I would have done better or worse had I been more aggressive? As it was, I felt as if I played each hand correctly so I didn’t mind losing the $25.

Sadly, the tournament was not what I was hoping for. Having played in some no-limit hold ‘em tournaments at Foxwoods, I was expecting 50 or 60 players at this noon stud affair. There were only six of us. The house gave us the option of taking our buy-ins back and canceling the tournament. But we had all driven down to play in a stud tournament. So that’s what we elected to do.

The proper strategy for playing a six-handed tournament is different from playing a multi-table tournament or even a single-table tournament with a full table. A lot depends on the particular structure of the event.

This tournament had 20-minute blinds, a $5,000 starting stack, and a $50/100 limit to begin. The limits went up by either 50% or 100% each level. This makes it a moderately accelerating deep-stack tournament. There is a premium for careful, solid play. Though it’s always nice to accumulate chips early, there’s no need to bully anyone at the start.

As it was, this tournament was an extreme example of how to play short-handed cash games. Have patience, wait for either high-quality hands or excellent situations, and then be aggressive.

The experience can be very difficult – watching, as one will, the passing back and forth of large amounts of chips, as other players aggressively push against each other for small advantages. But waiting and watching is generally the best approach. Let other players get impatient, play too aggressively, and get knocked out – leaving you in the money.

After four hours of this I was in the money. That, in and of itself, might not seem like much of an accomplishment, considering that three of the six starters cashed. But after four hours it sure seemed like something. By then, I was impatient. And the 50%, 30%, 20% split was so flat that I couldn’t justify sticking around (and I guess it provided a convenient excuse for becoming wildly aggressive). I incorrectly ramped up my aggressiveness, pushed very hard – almost maniacally, and busted out shortly after making the money. The better strategy for winning the event would have been to wait until either of the other two players got impatient – and then watched them do what I did. But I didn’t have it in me to wait around. Hey, none of us are perfect!

In sum, let me list the general strategy tips for playing in a short-handed tournament:

1. With a deep stacked structure, put a premium on patience;
2. Wait for high quality starting cards;
3. Let opponents knock themselves out;
4. Resist the urge to gamble with borderline cards – especially early in the tournament;
5. Play very aggressively when you have an advantage – but wait until you’re sure you have that advantage;
6. Stay out of the way of players who have already locked horns. Let them fight it out between themselves;
7. If the structure is steep – with first getting more than 50% of the money, play to win;
8. With a shallow-structured event, shoot to make the money first, and then worry about where you’ll finish.

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